Battlefield Doctor: Dr. Chris Coppola

Norwich University's Colby Military Writer's Symposium is an annual event that gathers military writers together in Northfield, where a series of panels and presentations help to educate the student body and general public on relevant and pressing matters in today's military. I've looked forward to the event each year, and once again, I've been impressed with the quality and information this year.

The first presentation of the symposium was held in the Kreitzberg Library's multipurpose room, featuring Dr. Chris Coppola, author of the book Coppola: A Pediatric Surgeon in Iraq, where he recounted his experiences as a surgeon in Iraq during his two deployments. In years past, where the symposium has discussed larger issues such as counterinsurgency doctrine or civilian interactions in the battlefield, this represented a bit of a departure, because it shed a bit of light on a major combat element: the casualties.

Dr. Coppola noted that the casualty infrastructure that has been put into place in Iraq during the invasion and subsequent occupation was an unprecedented one in the history of warfare. At any point in the country, a soldier or casualty was never more than twenty minutes from a hospital: once a soldier was injured, a helicopter was flown in to the scene, and the casualty was evacuated to a hospital system. A system had been put into place, with hospitals numbered with a certain level, which would allow for a certain amount of treatment. The wartime hospitals ranged from a level one to a level three center, which would allow doctors to treat and stabilize the wounded. For more serious cases, people were evacuated to Germany by plane, to level four hospitals, and eventually, to level five hospitals in the United States.

According to Dr. Coppola, this was a key element to saving lives on the battlefield. His hospital, he told us, had a survival rate of 98%: if people went in with a pulse, they had a very good chance of surviving their visit. The short trip after being wounded helped: this wasn't always the skill of the doctors there, (although with the internet, they had access to a lot of information and the cumulative experience of prior doctors), but the fact that a wounded soldier with serious injuries could be treated very quickly. Another factor, he noted, was new equipment, such as body armor and vehicles engineered to redirect blast energy if hit by an IED.

However, doctors faced new types of wounds in addition to bullets: blast wounds from explosives, were common, and resulted in numerous types of injuries. As Dr. Coppola said: anything on the body can be hurt. When he received his first patient in Iraq, he saw that he had to treat five of the most serious wounds that could be done to a person.

Civilians were another major problem that they faced, as his hospital received far more civilian casualties than they did US soldiers or even enemy combatants. This was compounded by a couple of problems: the Iraqi healthcare system was broken, with numerous doctors killed or known to have fled the country, as well as being behind the times. As a result, when word got out that there was a pediatric surgeon in the area, people began to bring their children to the hospital, where doctors worked to fix other long-standing issues, such as birth defects, injuries, and other problems that treatments simply weren't readily available for families. While the primary mission of the doctors was to treat soldiers to return to the battlefield or stabilize them for further treatment, doctors played to their strength and helped within their specialties.

One particular anecdote, Coppola recounted a story of where a known insurgent had been brought in, who had talked about killing former patients. It was an incredibly difficult thing to have to do, treating the person, but they followed through and fulfilled their mission: treating patients who came through the door. Undoubtedly, this will be an ethical question that doctors will continue to face in the future.

Coppola wrapped up by addressing the affects of warfare long after the battle is over. He acknowledged some of the problems in the system at home, in the treatment of soldiers after they have returned home. Despite the issues, he said, we owe them the care. A 20 year old amputee, he said, has a better chance of rehabilitation, and incredible advances are being made in post-injury treatment. Other problems might come up in the near future, long after we've left the battle: soldiers who are using legal drugs, such as energy drinks and sleeping pills, might have an increased risk of mental problems, with undesirable problems after the fact: there's been a rise in suicides, fratricides, and long standing problems such as Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. That's a legacy of the war that we'll need to cope with, and learn to handle as the years move on.

Coppola's talk was an enlightening one: I have a feeling that it's something that should be seen by everyone, because of the graphic nature: it's a vivid demonstration of war's effects on the people fighting it, and the people unlucky enough to be in harm's way during the conflict. Coppola seemed optimistic, though, noting that where doctors had learned from their experiences, he learned from their experiences, and that he regularly consults on cases with doctors overseas, putting his own experiences to continued use.

Pirates + Lasers

The US Navy announced the other day that they used a HEL (high energy laser) to set a target boat on fire a mile away in choppy seas. It's a new, very science fictional advance for warfare, and it's something that's being lauded as a potential deterrent for piracy, and potentially for shooting down missiles or aircraft. The demonstration over the ocean, where there’s more to disrupt a laser beam, demonstrates a certain amount of technical advancement that seems very reminiscent of the advances in missile technology fifty years ago. There’s problems with this scenario, however, problems that extend beyond the technical aspects of the weapons to more structural problems. Tactically, a naval weapon such as this has some of its own advantages, but with a far more limited scope than what’s available at the present moment, and I can’t help but wonder at what the cost benefit would be, considering what must be going into the project to begin with. The ability to set a boat on fire has some certain non-lethal elements to it: doing something along those lines could be used to help disperse people on board a ship into the water, or onto lifeboats, rather than destroying the boat with a naval strike.

The BBC GlobalNews report had an interesting talk about the system, where a defense correspondent noted that something like this is not likely to replace something like a missile, given some of the drawbacks, such as the inability to attack something over the horizon line, but that it could very well be used, once the technique is refined a bit more, for anti-air craft and missile defenses.

The system has been talked about as a possible approach and deterrent to the growing piracy problem in and around Somalia, which strikes me as the wrong way to deal with this problem, and the type of thinking that doesn’t really solve the problem in the first place. A weapons system helps to solve the piracy problem on the spot, where it appears, but something like this does little, if anything, to address the underlying issues that cause piracy in the first place.

In this instance, it’s also been suggested as a potential deterrent, but when looking at the type of arsenal that’s available to deter pirates, ranging from warships to Navy SEAL teams, there’s already evidence that these tools aren’t acting as a deterrent. It’s entirely possible that despite the implementation of such a weapon, it wouldn’t serve as a deterrent when looking at the larger problem, as pirates find ways around the non-lethal tools that we’ve been putting out against them. Already, dazzling lasers and sound cannons have been deployed, and I can’t help but wonder if we’ll see them put on hearing protectors and goggles. Two years ago, I wrote about this shortly after Captain Richard Phillips was rescued.

I do like the idea of deterrence: it seemed to work during the Cold War, when the stakes were really high, and when everyone had something to lose if the USSR and the US went at one another with nuclear weapons. Deterrence works when one side realizes that they have little to gain by carrying out an action and take it seriously: in the case of the Cold War, the consequence of this was annihilation, which has a demonstrable impact on your popularity as a public figure (as in, most of your constituency will be dead). In this case, the stakes aren’t so high that Somali men aren’t willing to pile onto a boat, threaten and sometimes kill their crews and leave with a ransom – even in cases where they are killed, that doesn’t seem to solve the problem, probably because the state of Somalia is already problematic and that the risk of death at the hands of ship crews or various militaries is one worth taking.

Here, the only way that deterrence will work is if the act of piracy will bring on even more dire consequences. Following an attack, the US Navy would have to determine where the pirates were from, and completely destroy the ship, then move on to the port, then the families and home town of said pirate, before leveling everywhere where the former pirates walked, lived, ate and slept. And after that, for good measure, they’d lower the elevation a couple of more feet. That’s never going to happen – it might not even deter the pirates if they already have nothing to lose.

The solution remains: solve the underlying problem, and remove incentives wherever possible. Given the continuing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the conflict over Libya (not to mention our past history in Somalia), I’d hesitate to say that this is high up on our priorities list – even after an American couple was killed by pirates. So far, big business seems to be content as well to handle it monetarily, paying ransoms. The policy seemed to work in Libya back in the late 1700s, when the Barbary Pirates received tribute. The US’s first real conflict overseas was combating pirates when that tribute money stopped coming – I can’t help but wonder if the problem there will be more effectively solved if we took the same amount of money it takes to develop dedicated piracy weapons and simply pay them *not* to attack ships. Somehow, I don’t think, that with shiny new toys like this new laser system, that something like that will ever happen.

Libya

It's strange to see people who were adamantly against the Iraq and/or Afghanistan wars decry the Obama Administration's stance towards the uprisings in the Middle East, particularly when it comes to Libya and the violence that's broken out over the last couple of weeks. There's been calls for operations such as a no fly zone to prevent Muammar Gaddafi from attacking rebel forces and civilians in Libya, and while I'm not disputing that some form of intervention is a good idea, US military operations would be a bad idea, setting a further bad precedent for the country already embroiled in two wars across the world.

While the idea of military intervention as a tool to be used by an administration is one that has some merit, what first appears to be a fairly simple idea turns out to be a very difficult one to implement: to do so would be tantamount to a declaration of war on Libya. While the United States (and more importantly, along with United Nations peacekeeping forces) has upheld no-fly zones over countries such as Bosnia and Iraq in recent military history, Libya presents a far more challenging mission. Where Bosnia didn't have an extensive anti-aircraft network, and where Iraq had just been invaded, Libya has invested quite a bit of money in an organized military and defense force, one that would have to be dismantled and neutralized prior to the deployment of regular flights over the country.

This isn't an easy step, because it would require a number of different combat elements to undertake: dedicated support teams for the aircraft, up to date and accurate intelligence on the Libyan defenses, and the forces (air and ground, most likely) to take down their targets. This would have to happen while the United States is committed to two other combat missions, in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which take a serious amount of funding, personnel and equipment to keep going. Siphoning off planes and resources from either of those two locations would have an adverse impact on the ongoing operations over there (most likely hitting Afghanistan more heavily), which in turn causes long-term problems for the people on the ground in completing their own objectives.

This happens in an environment where the country has been increasingly war-weary, having seen the impact that war has on the country, to say the least of what's happened overseas. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower had sought to reduce the country's role in the world by not utilizing the U.S. armed forces as a sort of policeman for stopping communism, seeking to help prop up governments (for good or bad) in their own footprints. There are some practical lessons to be learned here, particularly the fiscal one, which sought to move the U.S.'s foreign policy to one that avoided costly wars continually after Korea, although there's a bit of a mixed record here. Transplanted into the present day, and pushing for an armed response to the Libyan conflict might bring about some short-term gains, but it could be counter-intuitive in longer strategic goals for the region, and it would represent a costly endeavor.

The U.S. would face reduced effectiveness of countering the Taliban forces in Afghanistan, because of the reduced personnel and air cover that they already enjoy, as forces are redeployed to the North African country, where a continual military engagement would quickly wear down equipment and personnel, if the experiences of Iraq and Bosnia are anything to go by, and that's with some of the major problems already taken care of. Landing ground forces in Libya would essentially be a third invasion of the country, with casualties expected as the U.S. jumps in the middle of a civil war, which can turn problematic when we already have a poor track record of understanding local culture, politics and strategy.

Furthermore, we would need to fully understand the larger strategic aims for the country. If the goal is simply to save lives, there alternatives, and if the goal is full on regime change, there would need to be a fully committed US (and most likely, UN) mission to undertake that, something that most likely won't sit well, not only with the American public (in the long term) or the European Union, which is already pulling away from coalition duties in Afghanistan and Iraq. A no-fly zone would most likely help to accomplish the first goal, but not the second, but it would require a significant military effort to undertake, an effort that will likely outstrip the direct benefit to the U.S. strategic goals for the region.

Ultimately, there is no easy answer to what will happen in Libya, but in all likelihood, military options, while on the table, won't be considered unless there is significant participation from European allies, something that I don't see happening any time in the near future, as they largely have their own internal issues to consider. It's a real shame, because America and its allies have come out of the last nine years with one of the most experienced and well equipped military forces than at any point in recent times. However, if the will and means aren't in place for a long-term military engagement, it's something that probably won't, or shouldn't happen. At the same time, if those calling for action in Libya already don't have the will or desire to support the goals that have been put into place in the Middle East already, it strikes me that there is some real evaluation required of the country and its desire to wage war. We all must live with the consequences of what we reap.

Two Speeches, Two Messages

This week marks the 50th anniversary of two important speeches in recent United States history, President John F. Kennedy's Inauguration Speech on January 20th, 1961, and President Dwight Eisenhower's final farewell to the nation on January 17th. One reflects the honest assessment of a president unchained and free to speak, the other constrained by politics and optimism. In a large way, each speech speaks to one's supporters, but also to the base elements that helps define the right and the left in the United States, and in a very real way, provide an excellent primer on not only the environment of the Cold War, but also some of the roots of political speculative fiction and ideas that helped to define an generation and an art that they consumed.

Eisenhower's speech is best known as the one where he warns against the establishment of a 'Military-Industrial Complex', famously stating:

"American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations."

There are some dense concepts and history behind this statement. The role of the United States and its relationship around the world was drastically altered in the years following the First and Second World Wars. Untouched by direct war on its borders, the United States, through the intense demands of warfare found itself an industrial, political and social savior of the world, and it remained through to the Cold War, with a conflict just five years later in Korea. Warfare on the scale of the Second World War has not been seen since, despite the rise of a second superpower in the form of the Soviet Union, a power that would directly impact the stance of the United States.

It would be interesting to see some form of alternate timeline, one where the Soviet Union didn't rise as it did, to see if the arms industry in the United States would continue onwards. The rise of a permanent arms industry and the rise in perceived threats against the United States and its interests are interlinked. This is not to say that there aren't grave threats against the country at that point in time - there were - but the way in which those threats were addressed were impacted by hostilities.

Kennedy seems to understand this in his own speech three days later, and opens with the following:

"The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet, the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe -- the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God."

This felt strange to me, and it feels off when compared to the more memorable point in Kennedy's speech: "And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."

The differences between Eisenhower and Kennedy's speech are markedly clear, and are completely at odds with one another, something not entirely surprising, considering the two men come from very different political backgrounds, and entered the executive branch with very different goals. Kennedy, a Democrat, sought to use the abilities of the government to help the people. Eisenhower sought to rein in what he saw as extensive governmental control over the country following the World Wars, feeling that government held back the country's abilities to grow and prosper. Put simply, both goals are exceedingly noble, good and helpful in different ways.

The roots of their political philosophies, however, spell some different futures and implications. Eisenhower presided over a point in time where the world faced a very real and credible threat from the Soviet Union, and ourselves during the Cold War. In a large way, his efforts to scale back the federal government and the spending that it incurred went towards efforts to scale back the conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and to let free market capitalism take the reins:

"Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partially because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers. "

This is a republican idea, in its purest form, and one that has several strong points to make: without the help of the federal government, how much would be different in the scientific progress of the United States? Certainly the development of rockets and intercontinental ballistic missiles would be changed, but as such, so to would scientific wonders such what programs such as NASA accomplished over their own histories. Eisenhower also ignores, to an extent, the reach at which industry has a hand in directing such scientific research, and I'm not sure that there's any different at times between a country that's governed by an overarching Federal Government and a strong corporate society.

Kennedy, on the other hand, looked towards the future with a stronger government leading the way and helping those in need, the ideals of the Democratic side of the coin together. A stronger government would help protect the nation against those who sought to do it harm (and we're ignoring here the idea that part of the problem is ourselves and our actions) and at the same time, support those in need, around the world. This, in a large way, is a reversal of what Eisenhower sought to do with his presidency, by reducing the need for the United States to combat communism around the world in small engagements by creating an arms race set to deter the Soviet Union. Kennedy's speech is one that is full of optimism, promising to combat "the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself". Noble goals, but ones that, in unrestricted form under his beliefs, ultimately lead to fascism, where Eisenhower's, taken to extremes, lead to an absolute libertarian and anarchist state.

This is where both speeches feel as though they are prime grounds for speculative fiction: in the extremes. "Where Kennedy states: Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country," many took it as a call for well intentioned public service, and went on to do this, while others could very well interpret that as a call for the citizens to serve the state absolutely. After reading Brave New Worlds, it's the start of a thought that could potentially lead to a very dark place for the country, and the very opposite of what is intended. (Note, I don't believe that this is what Kennedy intended - we're speaking in hypothetical terms here.) At the same time, Eisenhower notes "The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations and the power of money is ever present and gravely to be regarded.", and is as far away from what Kennedy noted just days later as Eisenhower was interested in going to the Moon. At the same time, while warning against the union of Government, Military and Industry, it's clear that he felt that a stronger corporate culture would help to guide the country to a better place, both leaving the people themselves to be free on their own (a good thing) but at the same time, slaves to a consumer culture. (This is also not to suppose that this was Eisenhower's intentions either).

Both Presidents stood in 1961 at the edge, looking into a murky future that held no clear answers for either philosophy that guided them. Their speeches are ones of optimism, importance and of warnings for the future. Of the pair, I believe that Eisenhower's was by far the most honest, tempered with experience and the freedom of being released from the requirements to help his successor into office. Kennedy spoke to his constituents, noting the troubles ahead, and emphasizing that they were the ones who made up the future, and that they, as a whole, could help make the future a better place.

Battle of the Bulge: Phase II

On December 17th 1944, from what I can tell so far, the 100th Infantry Division was ordered to the Bastogne, Noville, and Bras areas to stop the sudden attack by German forces. The 28th Infantry division found itself on its second day fighting for its survival as their entire divisional front was under attack, and member of the division, 1st Lt. Carl Hughes of the 102nd Cavalry Recon Squadron continued to make his way through enemy lines. The Battle of the Bulge was in full force in Germany and Belgium, and would continue to rage on for over a month.

The anniversary of the beginning of the battle saw the start of the second phase of my project documenting the Norwich University alumni who fought there. I had hoped to have finished the writing by this point, but that hasn't happened yet, but the research and collection of raw data has largely wound down for the project. From the data that I was able to collect, I've assembled a list of just under a hundred and fifty people from a variety of sources: publications, records, mentions, with thirty people confirmed with sources that they were present at some point, another 73 people who might have been there based on their unit, ten people who can be written off, with a further 30 people who may or may not have been there, but with very little to go on, other than a country reference.

This collection of raw data has some additional bits of information that goes along with each student: their rank, unit, whether they were wounded or killed, what medals they earned, and any other additional notes. As a whole, it's a wealth of information that only tells me a couple of certain points that help lead to the next stage.

Raw data by itself is somewhat useless. I can tell you ten things about Carl Hughes. He was a first lieutenant in the 28th Infantry division with the 102nd Cavalry Recon Squadron, that he graduated from Norwich in 1942, that he received the Bronze and Silver Stars in addition to a purple heart, and that he walked through enemy lines for three days following the attack when his unit was surrounded. The next step involves adding context to the situation.

Going unit by unit, this next step involves adding that context. With it, I've learned that the 28th Infantry Division had taken the first impact of the German advance on December 16th, along a 25 mile stretch that enveloped the division, and that from the 16th through the 22nd, the unit was involved in heavy fighting before pulling back on the 22nd to Neufchateau to reorganize. This additional layer helps to put the individual experiences of the soldiers into better context.

With rare exceptions, student information on their individual experiences during the battle are rare, and in those instances, I have a paragraph at the most, or a brief sentence at the least that indicates that an alum was present at any part of the battle. The additional information as to what the units as a whole were up to help to fill in the blanks and gives me a general idea of what any given student might have been doing at the time. Furthermore, the individual data points that make up Norwich Students on the timeline helps to etch out a clearer understanding of how the battle worked: it was complicated, with numerous fronts, battles and units involved. Approaching the battle from the people who studied at Norwich also helps to demonstrate the impact that Norwich itself played during the battle, much like I discovered with the Operation Overload paper that I wrote in 2007. There was a collective Norwich experience that was widespread throughout the conflict.

This next step is far from done - quick passes through the Army Historical blurbs allow me to pin point some key dates for units, and a second pass will help to put in more detail for some of the larger units, such as the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 17th Airborne Division, which seems to have a larger collection of Norwich men within it. With a codified timeline in place, the events of the battle can be put down into more detail, and a larger story of the Battle of the Bulge will appear, seen through the eyes of the school's alumni.

It's an exciting bit of work as I am able to gather more and more information on individual units and to see the battle emerge from the raw data points that I've collected. One thing is for sure so far: Norwich University was present on the front lines (and in one case, above them) and undoubtably, given some of the notations, medals and units that these men earned and occupied, it had some hand in the outcome of the battle, providing a basis for the actions of the men who fought in 1944 and 1945.

Good Leadership means Continued Learning: ADM Thad Allen at Norwich University

Last night, Retired Admiral Thad Allen talked before a group of Norwich University students and Northfield residents for the latest entry in the Todd Lecture series, with a talk titled 'Leading Through Crisis and Times of Change'. Adm. Allen is uniquely qualified on this particular subject, having served as the person in charge for the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita cleanup just after the storm destroyed parts of New Orleans, the Haiti Earthquake and as the National Incident Commander for the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico earlier this year. Each disaster was an unprecedented event that warranted extraordinary response measures, and in each case, the issues that

Leadership was the focus of the talk, amongst the times when leaders were most needed to complete and correct the problems that have typically faced the country. While Allen's experiences are monumental, major disasters, much of what he had talked about were very applicable lessons for everyone: ways to confront challenges in the workplace, in the community, and if needed, on a state or national level. Over the course of its history, the country has tackled a number of challenges and problems facing it, and there is no doubt that there will be plenty more in the future. One of the key things that I've found in both my education and employment at Norwich University (more so with my employment) is that leadership is an incredibly important thing when it comes to any organization.

When Katrina and Rita hit New Orleans, Allen likened it to the effect of a weapon of mass destruction, without the criminal element, and then response to the problem. Had the city been hit with a nuclear weapon or something that could produce a similar effect, a vastly different response would have been put together. A key element in leadership is the people in place who can reconcile both competency and opportunity in the face of a situation while seeking the appropriate outcome. The major issue with the Katrina disaster was that the people in charge of the recovery at first didn't understand what the problem was. There was a broken link between understanding what the priorities were, and applying the resources accordingly. When he arrived eight days after the storm, a different problem had to be tackled, with authorities operating without a clear chain of command. They broke the city up into different sections, with various organizations such as the Marines and 82nd Airborne taking control of specific tasks. First responder teams worked to provide logistical, security and rescue support for each house in the city, with the members of these teams given the authority to work under the Mayor of the city.

The thing that struck me the most was how much of leadership consisted of problem solving, and just how profound the realization was that problems changed dramatically while they're playing out, and that the best response often comes beforehand, with people under one's command / supervision who can be used to deal with problems as they arise. When it came to Haiti, Allen likened it to Katrina on a much larger scale, and with other, additional problems. While the country's leaders had survived, the UN mission found itself without leadership when their building collapsed, causing problems interfacing between the country and the rest of the world. As what had been found during the Katrina response, a clear, unified command wasn't present in the country. Many of the lessons that were learned during Katrina were applied in the response to Haiti, to the effect of where U.S. command and control infrastructure was packed up into a C-140 and flown down.

Haiti was devastated, and once again, relief efforts had to utilize the resources at hand. Port du Prince was destroyed, Allen said, due to engineering and the magnitude of the quake, cutting off the only major way to receive large amounts of materials. As a result, the air space was restricted, and a large-scale effort was put into place to bring in supplies by air. At the peak of the air operations, 160 flights per day were landing, helped by several years of work from the 1st Air Force and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. NGOs on the ground were also used, because the people on the ground knew the people that they were delivering relief to: a human response to the human problems was needed, and helped in a lot of ways.

The next major issue was the one that is still in the news: the Gulf Oil Spill. Allen was very clear on a couple of points: despite the controversy over BP’s role in the spill, his attention was on the parts that needed to be taken care of right away: containing the spill, capping the well and killing it. Despite the fact that the oil company had a hand in the disaster, they made incredible efforts to kill it, and faced enormous technical and engineering problems that resembled more of Apollo 13 than the Exxon Valdez.

Additionally, there wasn’t an apparent role for the federal government: this started off as a private sector problem, and BP wasn’t seen as a responsible party because they weren’t answerable to the general public.

The oil spill was incredibly complicated. The spill had to be stopped, and three missions emerged: the technical problems with stopping hot hydrocarbons gushing out at 12,000 psi into a cold environment, an oil spill on the surface that changed every day with the wind, and protecting the coastlines. The scale of this disaster dwarfed the response plans currently in place, and was so different (aimed towards something along the lines of a tanker spill than a blow out) that it required a new way of thinking. Once the response came under way, a massive job was undertaken to coordinate the efforts: all efforts needed to be coordinated in order to bring about the best results: boats on the water cleaning oil and the shorelines, and when an organization becomes complex in ways such as this, some things break down.

One thing was transparency, which Allen noted was essential in this day and age. People are armed with cameras, social media, and are willing to use them, and in this instance, while responsible parties can work on coordination and delegation, people on the ground need to be included, with the assurances that what they’re doing will be backed up by the people in charge. A transparent organization works the best, because it tends to be self-correcting. It was noted that the decision to put up cameras was a positive one, because people could see what was going on, and when things were starting to get better. Requests to put a time delay on the video were denied, because it would damage perceptions that the company and cleanup efforts were honest and doing what they were supposed to.

Coming out of these three disasters, Allen imparted several key things when it came to leadership. The first is that anyone can be a better leader, and that the best leaders never stop learning. They continue to learn and adapt to the situation, and from prior disasters or incidents, lessons can be learned. Lessons 9/11 informed Katrina, which informed Haiti, which in turn informed the Gulf Oil Response.

Second, leaders cannot lead from the top down, the bottom up or from the center: they lead from everywhere. The human element of any response is a key thing, and people who are working to address a problem need to be empowered to do their jobs, with someone backing them up from the top. According to Allen: “To be a better leader, you must become a better person,”

What strikes me as most relevant to these points is not that they are only applicable to major disasters, but to any number of instances that most people face, and the key to this talk was that leadership can be found everywhere, in everyone: people need to recognize when actions are needed, by managing the appropriate resources available in the proper way.

What struck me the most was how focused Adm. Allen was throughout the talk, especially when he spoke about social media and the 24/7 newscycle that we now have in the country. They key element seems to be to adapt and work with people on the ground who want to help, but to remain focused on the task at hand, regardless of perceptions, pundits and political elements who have their own agendas. His view of BP clashed with the perceptions of the public and that of the media, and while he noted that they had their own issues in their image, they approached the problem with the best of intentions where it was needed: without the resources and expertise that BP provided and applied to the spill, the crisis would have been much worse.

In the future, he noted, there needs to be a better doctrine to shift from short-term solutions to long term recovery for places such as Katrina, Haiti and the Gulf, which in and of itself will require new ways of thinking about problems. In the meantime, lessons need to be learned for how to tackle the next unforeseen problem that will face the country: natural disasters, attacks, industrial mistakes, and so forth are all possibilities, and the only sure solution will be someone who can find an effective way to recognize the problems and apply the proper response needed. Such effective leaders should empower those under their supervision, and will be ones who will learn from the experiences and lessons of the past.

The Start of Something Fantastic: SpaceX Orbits the Earth

Yesterday, at 10:43 in the morning, a Falcon 9 rocket carried a Dragon capsule into a low earth orbit, where it circled the Earth twice before splashing down on target 500 miles off the coast of Southern California. This marked the first time that a private commercial firm has accomplished such a task, joining only a handful of countries (The United States, Russia, China, India, Japan and the European Space Agency) by going into the skies above. By doing so, it has marked the start of a new age in space travel, one that is independent of governmental agencies. Even more astonishing, this comes from a company that was founded a mere eight years ago.

The rise of SpaceX (Space Exploration Technologies Corp.) comes during a time of stagnation in space exploration. The last manned mission to the moon occurred in 1972 with Apollo 17, with Skylab crashing down to Earth in 1979 while Russia's Mir Space Station followed in 2001. The American space shuttle was first launched in 1981, heralding in its own age of scientific exploration by launching satellites, conducting repair and resupply missions and generally serving as an orbital laboratory for scientific project, and sees its own mission end early next year with two final flights. Finally, the International Space Station, a testament to international cooperation and scientific endeavor, was launched in 1998, and is scheduled for completion next year. In spite of the numerous accomplishments that NASA and other space agencies have achieved over the last three decades, their efforts have gone unrewarded by the general public and political elements, who see the efforts as a waste of money and time on behalf of the people.

Space and operations in orbit are something that will continue in the near future, and the introduction of a commercial firm is something that will help to supplement the people in orbit. Commercial firms also have the ability to break the monopoly that governments are able to hold on space operations by opening up access to Earth's orbit for not only people, but additional platforms in the skies for businesses and travel.

That future is still something that is far off, and will require an immense amount of preparation, coordination and regulation in order to become fully viable, safe and profitable for interested parties. There is a growing problem with objects in Earth's orbit, which caused collisions and dangerous conditions for astronauts and hardware, while the expense for trips into orbit is high. (SpaceX charges upwards of $43.5 million for up to 3,000 kg) Space is still something outside of the general public, and like any big, complicated, dangerous activity, it'll take a while for the prices to go down to a more affordable level, and for an entire industry to take form to support it.

An independent, forward-thinking and rational commercial future for space allows for a great deal of independence. Companies won’t be constrained by political whims and budget shortfalls, but by economic pressure to succeed amongst a pack of competitors. There will be a regulatory body to keep the conduct of these companies in check (and when you’re talking about the risks of spaceflight, this is something that will be needed), and companies will be able to expand and explore new possibilities and ventures much faster than a governmental body, and the advances that they find and create can translate into new opportunities for those of us on the ground.

As the United States grapples with economic problems, Space should be the next frontier and direction for U.S. business interests to move forward to. Long-term efforts into space bring about the possibilities of incredible exploration, scientific discovery, mineral wealth and virtually unlimited space for growth and real estate. The United States maintains a massive advantage over other countries, and would do well to foster the development of a space industry within the United States to help better its own economy (think of the requirements for skilled labor and jobs that such a line of work requires) and to bring humanity further into the stars.

The futures that have long been seen in science fiction novels, television shows and movies are still a long way off, but the steps taken by SpaceX, and the other private firms that are sure to follow over the next couple of decades make me hopeful for the futures that we might have in orbit and beyond. Maybe, just maybe, within my lifetime, I'll be able to look down on the Earth and smile.

Defending Korea & Continual Conflict

Korea has been at the forefront of the news over the past couple of weeks as violence has begun to escalate between the North and the South following a North Korean shelling of the South Korean island Yeonpyeong in response to a series of planned military exercises. The escalation of violence seems to have been rising, when an attack on a South Korean warship left almost fifty sailors dead. Indeed, the two countries seem to be a rapidly drying powder keg with a new South Korean leader, and with the expected promotion of Kim-Jong Il's son, Kim Jong-un at some point in the near future. With almost 30,000 American soldiers just to the south of the 38th parallel, an outbreak of war in the country is something that will heavily impact the United States. With two major conflicts on their way out the door, the prospect of another confrontation abroad is a sobering one.

In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower became the 34rd President of the United States, where he had campaigned on countering Communism, Korea and Corruption. Despite leading the Allied military against Adolph Hitler and his allies in Europe, Eisenhower sought to bring down the national budget on a platform of fiscal conservatism, bringing about deep cuts in the military budget and recognizing a new philosophy and approach to the United State's presence in the world.

After visiting Korea, Eisenhower sought to bring the United States and its efforts to an end, and with a cease-fire (although no resolution) to the conflict, was able to fill a major campaign goal that aligned with his beliefs: the United States did not, and could not fight in every battle across the world with a massive standing army, able to engage in more conflicts such as the one just waged in Korea. Under his 'New Look' plan, approved in 1953, which allowed the U.S. to utilize technology and America's atomic stockpile as a means to deter open aggression from the Soviet Union from directly attacking the U.S.. The policy was designed to rein in defense budget spending on a massive conventional force, while spending less on a more technologically oriented one that wasn't necessarily required to do anything but exist.

The recent troubles in Korea bring to mind some of the issues that have been ongoing in the political and military scenes recently. As the country begins to move in the direction of less spending (at least the attitude is there, somewhat), reducing the fiscal situation of the United States will require something along the lines of what Eisenhower had envisioned for the country half a century ago: reductions on all fronts, including military spending. The policies that were put into place were engineered with the fear that the country's financial footing had a corresponding impact on the nation's national security standing in the world. America, with a growing economy, population and budget, could face major problems as it was, and potentially, with the added need of continual fighting abroad in conflicts that were similar to Korea, the country’s stability could be at risk.

In a large way, the series of conflicts that followed September 11th fall right into what Eisenhower feared for the country: exceedingly high defense budgets for an expensive war where the United States has gotten its hands dirty in areas perceived to threaten the country’s security. Eisenhower had pushed against full American engagement in Vietnam, and it wasn’t until after his term in office that the conflict escalated for several Administrations, from which point the U.S. was able to stay out of major engagements until 1991, for Operations Desert Shield and Storm. Here, the theory of technological warfare as a superior form of conventional warfare was validated: for the 372 coalition soldiers killed as a result of the conflict, around 30,000 enemy soldiers were killed.

The fight in Afghanistan and Iraq are different: the U.S. has been slow to adapt to the new environment of warfare, plunging in with certain assumptions and coming out with an entirely different experience than was expected. Continual fighting in small conflicts will cause further problems for the country, especially if such conflicts are not properly understood and the ways in which to fight them are imperfectly realized.

The Eisenhower administration’s plans to deter fighting against the country worked, in part. The threat of massive retaliation faced its biggest test in October of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and demonstrated that the threat of assured destruction of both countries (not to mention everyone else caught in the crossfire and were downwind) was enough to force both players back down. At the same time, it hasn’t been able to prevent warfare outright: Vietnam was a war in which the nuclear issue was largely side-stepped, and would cause problems years down the road, while American involvement in areas such as Haiti, Panama, Somalia and other smaller countries and conflicts have not been decreased, although their significance doesn’t approach the scale of something like the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Iraq and Afghanistan wars are both abnormal conflicts, and two fights that signal some frightening precedents for the future. Already into its 9th year, the combined conflicts have cost an estimated $1.1 trillion, for a conflict that seems to run counter to the vision that Eisenhower had hoped for and seems to have done precisely what Eisenhower feared such battles would do to the country’s financial status. In the future, what conflicts does the United States have in store, if it can enter into a war-like state whenever it sees reason to do so?

The prospect of renewed war in Korea only adds to the fears of a continued lack of restraint when it comes to spending. Political elements in the United States have called for fiscal restraint, but the exception seems to be the money that pours in for the military. While the front-line soldiers need the financial support in order to accomplish the mission in front of them, the country needs to adopt a mindset of reducing the need for the soldiers to be requiring that money in the first place: avoiding costly confrontation across the world by recognizing which conflicts should be fought. The practice of deterrence will likely not work in this new environment of war: multinational political groups are harder to deter. Deterrence in Eisenhower’s day was the best means to contain spending and effectively protect the country from those who wished harm against the country. In the present day, we need to do much the same: figure out the best way to defend the country without oversight and restraint.

Should the tensions between North and South Korea break, the United States will likely have some hand in the issue, and we could find outselves in a third major conflict at a time when we can't afford to become entangled.

Vote

I'm not voting for Brian Dubie today. I can't say that I'm terribly enthused for voting for his opponent, Peter Shumlin, because the prospect of a unified House, Senate and Governor in the state also isn't all that terribly appealing to me. However, that fear isn't outweighed by the fear of not a Republican in the office again, but by an incompetent one.

When I graduated from Norwich, our speaker was Mr. Dubie, a life-long Vermonter and member of the Vermont Air National Guard (where he's earned the Meritorious Service Medal with an Oak Leaf Clusters for his actions during September 11th and Hurricane Katrina), and serves as a pilot for American Airlines and is a co-owner of the Dubie Family Maple Orchard here in Vermont. In addition, he has been Vermont's Lt. Governor for four terms. He first won his office against Peter Shumlin in 2002. I'm a little surprised that we haven't seen this come up yet in the campaign.

The gubernatorial race for Vermont has been an exceedingly negative one, and highlights the worst in both parties. The Democratic side ran five candidates for governor, and engaged in recount that cost them two weeks against Dubie, who ran unopposed. I didn't bother voting for any of the candidates, because they were all essentially shilling the same message: Expanded healthcare, close down Vermont Yankee, and revitalize jobs in the state. Dubie has firmly remained behind building jobs, and has stubbornly refused to move off of that message. As soon as Shumlin entered the race, the gloves came off, and both sides have attacked one another mercilessly. I'm very, very glad that I don't watch TV or listen to radio with commercials very much.

My impressions of Dubie, however, don't come from his service, but from how he seems to work, it was from the speech that he gave at my graduation last year. Clearly already thinking of running for Governor, the talk was a bloated, incoherent talk about Dubie, and how he was someone who shot from the hip and talked down Cuban diplomats. Coming out of a program that emphasized writing and organization as a way to convey a clear and concise message to your audience, it was disheartening, at best, to see someone talk for an extended amount of time with absolutely no point or moral to what he was saying. If someone can't organize (or make the point to organize) what they are saying to a group of people, how can they be expected to run a state with the same level of organization?

Fundamentally, I disagree with some of what Dubie says and on what he has been campaigning for. I dislike him as a person, his approach to doing things, and his attitude towards his responsibilities. I don't disagree on how jobs are important to the state, but they're not the only thing that occupies the public's attention or interest. As such, I see anyone who wants to focus only on one issue as being narrow minded, and I do question their ability to react to changes in the script. Jobs in the state will change, and demand attention, but at the same time, other issues are important to Vermonters. Similarly, I don't believe that wielding a knife and making extensive cuts to the state will Vermonters; a more nuanced approach to the issue (a series of cuts and strategic spending choices) is required, and Dubie's already shown that he's not a nuanced person. (Of course, neither is Shumlin, but I see him as recognizing the spending and cutting issue a bit better than Dubie).

When it comes to the political spectrum as a whole, I'm at a loss. I don't believe that either party has my interests at heart, beyond their own interests in beating back the other side. I want to vote as a Republican, because I believe that spending needs to be reined in to a more appropriate level, and that the level of national government needs to be scaled back. Over the course of my studies, I became a big fan of President Eisenhower and his policies in the 1950s. I'd like to see that again. I want to vote Democratic, because I believe that the Federal government has a duty to protect the people under it, from outside sources and from one another.

I won't vote for the Republican side of the house in general because their calls for lowered spending sounds hollow to me: they are the people who took a surplus and turned it into a major deficit. They're the ones who have denied people equal status in the law, and have frequently sought to vilify those who don't deserve it, while engaging in a massive war that seemingly has no end (to combat operations AND finances).

I don't want to vote for the Democrats because they can't seem to understand that we can't continue to place out future on a credit card, that they characterize the right as a group of racist, warmongering and homophobic bigots who will turn the country into a wasteland, and that they can't seem to get a cohesive message and agenda together that they can communicate.

I for one believe that the social messages come first and foremost, with finances as a close second. For this reason, Shumlin's getting my vote - I hope that he can fulfill his image of being socially liberal and financially conservative and working to make a balance between party line and the real needs of the state. I hope that he can keep spending under a bit of control in these troubled times, that he can effectively manage and replace Vermont Yankee, ensure that no more jobs are lost in the state, that we don't take a step back in the rights for individuals and so much more. I hope, because I have no way of trusting my elected officials any more. I hope that changes.

Hardwired Historian

As I've begun work on the Battle of the Bulge project, I've found that there have been some major changes in how I'm able to go about researching the event since the spring of 2007, when I did a similar research project on the Normandy Invasion. Since then, computers have become smaller, Norwich University has a campus-wide wireless network, and information on databases has grown.

Over the past couple of weeks, I've been pouring over books and file folders, hunting for references to soldiers who were in a set number of units, dates, locations, specific references to the Battle of the Bulge itself. Four years ago, I brought along a notepad and a couple of pens (or pencils, when I was up in the University Archives), and wrote down every reference that I could find, even the tangential students who might have been in the right area at the right time.

Fast forward to 2010, and the options have changed. Rather than taking a notepad and pen with me, I've been carrying my iPad and iPhone, on which I've been jotting down information as I find it. Slowly, as the lists are growing, I’m planning on taking the information and placing it onto a spreadsheet. While I do this, I’ve tapped into the wireless network, and as I come across soldiers in various units, I’ve discovered that running a quick check against the unit’s history online can help me determine if the soldier is someone I’ve been able to use, as their unit was present at the battle, or if they were somewhere else at the time, either because they hadn’t arrived, or were in another theater of operations altogether.

The move to electronic recording likewise has the benefit of being able to copy and paste my results directly into a spreadsheet, rather than having the extra step of translating my handwritten notes (no small task!) into the spreadsheet. The transfer of data is transferred between two mediums rather than three. (original, handwritten and computer). It allows me to keep information that I transpose intact far more easily than before.

The next step is something I’m thinking of trying: integrating this with Google Docs, which would allow me to keep my data online, accessible from any number of locations. Unfortunately, this isn’t a very practical thing on an iPad (I can’t easily tab between apps, and I don’t have the internet at home), but for some of the research portions, it seems like it would be an excellent thing to use, especially if someone is working with others. In this case, my girlfriend is helping out with some things, and the ability to update the same piece of data, without redundancies, would be helpful when gathering data is put together.

What I’m hoping is that the move to computers, rather than using handwritten notes, will allow me to be more efficient, and thus quicker, with the research that I’m working on. The amount of information that I need to go though: there’s something like five thousand additional files to go through when it comes to deceased students, not to mention the information on the units and after action reports that exist.

This also covers the first large phase of the research: gathering all of the raw data that I’ll need to form the basis of the project. The next step, actually distilling and then writing the report, is already digital: I can’t actually think of a time when I haven’t used a computer to type up a project. Those advantages are well known, and something that I know to work.

The Green Mountain Parkway and Vermont's Future

I heard a ridiculous commentary on the radio on the drive in this morning. As I cut through the hills between Montpelier and Northfield on Route 12, I listened to a comparison between the Green Mountain Parkway and a road that has been proposed in Tanzania, which would cut across the Serengeti.

In 1931, a highway was proposed the length of the state, similarly to the Blue Ridge Parkway in Virginia and North Carolina, and had the backing from various federal and state officials, while it was opposed by groups such as the Green Mountain Club. With a couple years of intense debate, the state voted in 1935, with the proposal failing in the House of Representatives, and going down again on town meeting date in 1936. Since then, the state has remained with two segments of highway: I-89, which cuts across West Lebanon and winds its way up towards Canada, travelling through Montpelier and Burlington on the way, while I-91 comes up from Massachusetts and shoots to the north. The Green Mountain parkway would have begun at the bottom of the state at Massachusetts and worked its way up through the middle of the state, connecting the western part of Vermont a bit more efficiently to New York and its namesake city.

I for one, would like to imagine what the state might have been like had the road been built. The 260 mile highway would have likely brought a number of needed jobs to the state during the Great Depression, and would have provided a massive infrastructure base for the future of the state. As the road never progressed beyond the planning state, we'll never know for sure, but after seeing the state have its own issues over the last couple of years, I would have imagined that such a project would have been heplful in the present day. The major population center, Burlington, is serviced by a small international airport (it goes to Canada), but is otherwise difficult to reach because of the lack of direct flights beyond some of the hubs, while reaching Burlington from somewhere like New York City by car means that someone has to drive up through Connecticut, Massachusetts and across the state in order to reach or, or up through New York and over some of the slower state highways. The short version is, it's not a quick trip.

Currently, the state has a difficult time retaining businesses. Companies such as Ben & Jerry's has remained in the state, but with most of its operations outsourced to other states or countries where regulations are a bit more lax. Burton Snowboards has relocated to Switzerland, and years ago, Mad River Canoe relocated away from its namesake Mad River Valley years ago. IBM has downsized some positions, and there have been rumblings that the company might leave at some point in the future, while a major startup, Dealer.com might put its expanding workforce in another state. It's difficult to grow a business here in the state, because of the location (NeW England is somewhat remote anyway), climate and terrain (Cold and mountainous) and its regulatory nature (fairly strict, geared towards preserving the state's image - Not a bad thing). One less avenue for transit is just one more thing against the state's own economy growing.

The reason, Dennis Delaney notes, is that the state would have destroyed a key part of the state's environment and natural beauty in order to make life easier for people. It's an easy enough reason to understand, and something that I support. I love how rural the state is, that its resisted the growth and population that New Hampshire (a state of similar proportions) boasts and that I can look up into the sky to see the stars without an incredible amount of light pollution. That being said, all of those benefits are able to be enjoyed because I'm employed and can enjoy Vermont for what it is, as well as the major source of income that comes from tourist dollars to see the state as it is.

What really gets me annoyed is Delaney's assertion that while infrastructure in Africa would likely help poverty (my understanding is that roads are bad, and much needed) in the continent, this major road project is something that should be shot down because it will harm the beauty of Africa, and the Serengeti. I can understand that to a point, but I would have to ask: how much does beauty compare to the human cost of poverty in the continent, and does the cost of keeping the African wilderness absolutely and completely pristine balance that? I'm not suggesting that the entire region be bulldozed and paved over, nor do I think that Western values will solve all of the problems overseas as a concerned liberal. Natural surroundings are important, should be preserved and protected, intensely. But at the same time, I believe that if there is something that can be done that will positively benefit the lives of people who have very little, it should be done, but it should be done intelligently. Create a roadway that will minimize the impact on the environment, put together protections for the herds that will travel across the road, create an engineering and technical marvel that will leave the road suspended tens of feet in the air.

I have heard the same arguments recently in the state (and out of state) when it comes to wind power farms that could reduce, in part, our dependence on energy technologies that are truly destructive, such as the failing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant or coal plants that leaves us with acid rain in the hills. People place the intrinsic beauty of their surroundings over projects that are likely essential to the growth of the state and that support the well-being of its citizens. The alternative could very well be something that would be far worse to see: a coal fired plant in Vermont? The expanding slums of a city? How about a state that is forced into further economic problems because it cannot retain a profitable base that would ultimately help the state and its people?

I, for one, do care about the environment of the state, as contrary as it seems to what I just said. However, one needs to be fairly realistic as how we interact with our surroundings, and realize in just what state we can enjoy Vermont's natural beauty. I for one don't believe that the state has to be abandoned and undeveloped to retain the mountains and forests of the state. We just need to be mindful of how everything fits together. Personally, I would have been interested to see a Green Mountain Parkway weaving its way up through the mountains: I-89 is already a gorgeous drive, and that doesn’t really take away from the beauty of the state as a whole. It certainly allows me access to the beauty of the state.

Journey to the Surface of the Earth

Yesterday, the 33 miners trapped inside a mine for almost two months were rescued via a small tube that brought them up to the surface. It's a gratifying end to a story that could have been immensely tragic at a number of points over the past couple of months, and their rescue is a small shred of good news in the world today, and watching and reading some of the actions that went into saving the men seem to me born out of this strange future that we're living in.

To fully appreciate what had to be done to save the miners, one needs to take a look at a diagram that the BBC had put together for their coverage of the accident. The engineering and logistical efforts of attempting to save a group of men a half-mile below one's feet is astounding in and of itself, from their discovery to their rescue, but the efforts that have been made to ensure that they are alive and healthy in ways that remind me much of the efforts to recover the damaged Apollo 13 spacecraft.

Unlike major disasters that seem to have fallen lately, from the West Virginia Mine accident and the Deepwater Horizon explosion, this was an accident that has been made better by a coordinated effort of people and technology, rather than a recovery effort to stem off the worst case scenario as people have identified the problem, and sought to fix it straight away, making this seem like one of the instances where we don't have to see the worse happen.

Moreover, I'm reminded of some of the best, and worse elements of people in this accident. Such preparations have been taken for the men down in the mines: they had communications with their rescuers on the surface, while they likewise had the ability to speak with psychologists to keep them from going crazy; consultants from submarine experts and NASA were brought in to help cope with their isolation. Workers were outfitted with dark glasses to prevent their eyesight from damage upon reaching the surface.

Given the nature of the accident, and the plight of the men down below, I'm surprised that there hasn't been more media coverage of this until now. It's barely registered on my radar, except when there was something more newsworthy about it: the news sources have always been good at covering far more of an event than is generally necessary, and there's been some indications of that. But at the same time, I'm surprised, because there are entire segments of reality television devoted to things such as this: people trapped together in a single place, unable to get away from one another. Given that the psychologists never had to prescribe antidepressants to the miners, I'm sure that there would have been little drama (because honestly, real life isn't really that dramatic, no matter the nomenclature of 'reality' TV), but I can certainly see some satirical speculative fiction novel written about a disaster, with television cameras present, to capitalize on it. Hopefully, we'll never see anything like that.

At the same time, there's been little attention (that I've seen) on what will be done to prevent something like this happening again. Clearly, something went wrong somewhere, and instances like BP's oil spill, the Massey Energy explosion or the Hungarian Aluminum Production and Trade Company sludge release don't fill me with any sort of confidence that companies are looking out for the safety of their workers at the expense of major disasters happening that will adversely affect them in the long run.

There will be other disasters in the future, that much can be sure: accidents and corporate goals will likely guarantee that, but hopefully, the resources and dedication that have been demonstrated in Chile will be brought out the next time people need to be brought home from disaster.

The Battle of the Bulge

In 2007, I went overseas to France, shortly after I finished college, to help provide the Norwich University side of things for the battlefield staff ride that we took. The D-Day study (which is partially documented here in the archives) was the final paper that I had written for my undergraduate coursework. Back in May of 2007, I had realized that this was something that I found interesting, and noted that I could easily expand this sort of research to encompass other elements of the European Theater of Operations.

I've largely kept things under my hat lately, but now that I've started, it's something that I can talk more freely about. While I'm not expanding my D-Day paper, I've been asked by Norwich to write another one, and to consult on an upcoming Staff Ride. This time around, I'll be focusing on the Norwich University Students who fought at the Battle of the Bulge at the end of 1944.

The battle, largely regarded as the last credible push on the part of the Germans during the Allied advance towards Germany, was a massive coordinated pushback that trapped U.S. forces behind enemy lines, and slowed Allied efforts in their push towards ending the war. Like in Normandy, Norwich students fought and died there, and occupied a number of positions within the U.S military.

This is a project that I'm very eager to return to, and the research phase has me very excited. This project will be coming in a couple of phases. The first, which I've started, is the research element, and I'm going to be specifically targeting several achieves and sources here at Norwich, starting with the yearbooks (a memorial edition from 1947 was what I tackled today, with very good results), and the Norwich University Record, the alumni paper, two sources that provided an incredible amount of information, along with two archives up on campus, which should provide some additional detailed information and allow me to draw up a roster of possible participants in the battle. From there, cross-checking each soldier's unit based on the historical record and actions of said unit will help to weed out the people who wouldn't have possibly been there. Student X was in Unit Y, but Unit Y didn't arrive into the area until day Z, which was after the battle, for example.

Running parallel to this will be research into the battle itself, looking for specific dates, people, unit actions and the story to which Norwich personnel will be placed. Here, the people I am looking at will be a small and unique look into how the battle went.

Once the research phase is over, the writing will begin, which I'm planning on starting around November, and finishing up by December. January through March/April is a little more fluid, but I'm guessing that I will be editing, fine-tuning and researching small details for the paper, while preparing presentations for the actual staff ride, which will take place in May of next year. Needless to say, I'm flattered and excited for this entire project.

This style of research makes a lot of sense to me, because I can work to connect the actions of the soldiers in the field to an institution that is steeped in history, and link said actions to the overall mission of the school, and provide a historical context and concrete examples of where graduates have changed the world through their actions. (And, some of these soldiers have accomplished incredible things, helping to see through the successes of various operations and actions throughout Norwich’s history.)

Learning to Understand

Earlier today, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Gen. Gordon Sullivan, spoke at the museum at Norwich University's campus that bears his name for a brief talk to students. As he opened, he noted that he didn't have a plan for what he wanted to talk about, but pointed out objects in one of the rooms that related to his experience within the time that he had spent in the military. Over the course of his 36 year career, Sullivan has seen a lot: he volunteered to go to Vietnam and served for a couple of tours there, while his career culminated in his presiding over the transition of the U.S. Army after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the massive changes that came as a result of that. A number of points that Sullivan brought up stuck with me over the course of his talk.

General Sullivan is a person that I personally admire greatly, and I’ve had the pleasure of meeting him a couple of times: the first was in 2007, shortly after I graduated from Norwich with a B.A. in History. Several short days after I walked, I boarded a plane for England, then France, and found myself in Normandy with a contingent from Norwich, with Generals Sullivan and Nelson leading the tour of the battlefield, providing a rich amount of historical context for the battlefield, but also an incredible amount of information on the value of good leaders. There is no better place to highlight that issue than on a battlefield, and over the years since, I’ve become fascinated in how this can be applied to everyday life.

One topic that he touched on has particular significance in the modern face of warfare. “It takes troops on the ground, not technology, to solve problems.” To illustrate this, he picked up a piece of metal, a tool that was used in gun, and pointed out that it took over a hundred people to make that part: it was a high tech piece of machinery, and is likely the cumulative result of thousands of hours of research and development, testing and deployment. He then took our attention to a wooden cowbell on the wall of the exhibit, noting that we (The U.S.) were operating in an area where this was a level of technology, and that the combatants on the battlefield could face the United States and come out victorious.

During his tenure of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during the Clinton Administration, he was working to transition the military after the end of the Cold War, when the operation at Mogadishu resulted in a number of U.S. casualties. The point that he made seemed to wear on him, and he noted that every soldier that died represented a huge loss, losses that the rest of the army, and himself, as the top of the chain of command, were responsible for. And, he noted, this was in a time of peace. His attitude towards the current operations is fairly clear: “You can't kill your way to victory”, and through this, the U.S. has to work with people, get them to change their minds, in order to succeed in this new battlefield.

At one point in his talk, Sullivan noted that he was proud to be a Norwich graduate: "I am proud to say that I took an oath in 1955... I've been part of this for 50 years, and it started here." (paraphrased), and that Norwich was an important place in his life. This has gotten me thinking all afternoon about the value of the two educations that I’ve earned here. The world, and military affairs are incredibly complicated businesses, and a certain level of comprehension brings about a different understanding of the situation.

The military affairs that are going on now are not as cleanly cut as portrayed, and winning is simply not as it was fifty years ago. The military has an ongoing change as its mission shifts from one enemy to others, and with different styles of fighting. Leadership, of the highest caliber, is required to guide these transitions, and I believe that the education that I’ve gotten here, and since earning the official stamps of approval, have given me the mindset that is really required of understanding (at least in part) some of these elements, which I feel will become even more important to our lives. However, as it grows in importance, there needs to be a greater importance in comprehending said events.

I personally count my time in Normandy as one of the most formative educational experiences of my life. I hope that others will follow.

MilSF & Society

Earlier today, I had a post go up onto io9 titled 'What Is Military Science Fiction?', with the intent of looking at what defines books that are generally classified as such. The end result? While there's a lot of books that look towards the military for their stories exclusively (Think Baen Books), there's a second grouping of books that utilizes the military to an extent, some of which are somewhat surprising, like Dune and The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, which generally aren't thought of as such.

The general problem that I see with military science fiction is that they're not about the military: it's about the people in the military, and their (or society's) experiences with warfare. This seems to be a large gap in understanding, given how much warfare generally impacts fighting in American lives: if you go back through U.S. history over the past century, you would have to go to the 1980s before you found a year that the country wasn't engaged in military operations, publicly. Including classified and forgotten operations, you'd be hard pressed to find a time when we haven't been shooting at someone. Thus, it's essential for an understanding of why people go to war, especially in the speculative fields, because it's such a major impact.

One of the more enlightening quotes that I pulled comes from William Gibson: "Every fictive, imagined future can only be understood historically within the moment it was written." This is huge, and it explains everything that art tries to do in every field: it explains the present by looking at how we comprehend our surroundings. Looking at a lot of the military SF field, it's no wonder that the Second World War plays such an impact in the speculative military fields; it plays a huge role in our lives now.

Beyond that, however, it's no wonder that we look to futuristic warfare to understand the present. Science Fiction helps to take the present out of context, so the reader understands things from another perspective. Joe Halderman's The Forever War looks at experiences that are closely linked to coming home from Vietnam, with a sort of culture shock from returning soldiers.

Other authors have realized, through other works, the roles that politics and radicalism play in the greater picture, and this is why, I think, some books aren't thought of as being military-centric: the actions that surround warfare, such as the political motivations and societal issues, aren't directly linked to war and fighting, but help to give it some context, something that is badly needed in a lot of stories.

The ongoing war in Afghanistan and Iraq are two wars that require a lot of context. In Iraq's case, one has to look closely to American foreign policy and political circles to best understand the motivations for going to war (agree with them or not, there are some deep seeded reasons, not all of them bad, for going in). There is likewise a necessary examination required to look at Osama Bin Laden's motivations for forming Al Qaeda, which in turn links to other things. War is not a clear-cut and dried action or series of actions, and unfortunately, it is often presented as such.

This is why, I think, Military Science Fiction isn't all that great at being able to predict where warfare will go: there is already a lot of disagreement amongst historians and theorists as it is, over elements that lie in the background of the fighting, while speculative elements look towards the technology for inspiration, while they should instead be looking more at how people think about, and actually conduct warfare.

The ongoing battles going on right now across the world are way more science fictional than any sort of story that we've been able to come up with. Insurgents operate in ways that are vastly different than anticipated. A terrorist armed with a mobile phone, the internet and all the resources of the planet, guided by radical ideas fed to him by someone he's never met can go and become part of a fight and push forth a political message. If there's ever a scary, speculative story that keeps someone up at night, that should be it.

Awash in Flames

The Dove World Outreach Center in Florida is planning on burning the Islamic Holy text on the anniversary of September 11th, despite statements from the White House, General David Petraeus and even Glenn Beck, of all people. The pastor of the church, Rev. Terry Jones, has claimed that he's taken the concerns into consideration, but all indications are that the church still intends to move along with their plans. I'm stunned (although sadly, not at all surprised) that people continue to spout such hate, regardless of the consequences.

General David Petraeus has since e-mailed a statement to the Associated Press, noting that such acts are already seeing some impact overseas, and has warned that the consequences will be immediately used by extremist factions as propaganda against the U.S. cause overseas. Acts against Muslim icons, such as Mohammad or the Koran have been seen to ignite public opinion against the west, with the Danish cartoon controversy a couple of years ago, as well as the news that a Koran might have been flushed down a toilet during the course of an interrogation at Guantanamo Bay.

While this is an act that is certainly a small one, the consequences of such actions are deliberatively provocative, and miss some of the major, underlying points when it comes to the motivations behind the war. The pastor, Jones, belongs to a group that believes that the return of Christ will happen in the modern day, and that they have a mission to combat evil: something that they see the Koran as falling under. When it comes to current events, it is a short leap to what it seems is a more common belief amongst Americans: the Islamic community of the world is fundamentalist and violent, because of their religion, which is a ridiculous argument.

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East is not strictly a religious confrontation, but a politically motivated battle that utilizes religion as a tool to organize its followers. Looking at the violence across Palestine, Iraq, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, it helps to look at the incidents and attacks. Suicide bombers and other fanatics tend to be those who follow their leaders, carrying out orders, not the leaders of such movements themselves. The violence is also not religiously motivated: these are people who are not trying to convert followers by destroying them. Rather, the attacks are against those perceived as aggressors that are encroaching on one’s territory, and in a large way, on an established order that is highly resistant to change.

The strict, fundamentalist views of Islam are not things to be defended: they represent amongst some of the more horrifying elements of any organized religion, and like any larger religion, it is not a view that is shared by all. Fanning the flames (quite literally, in this instance) will do little but turn more people against the interests of peace in the world. In this instance, burning these books will undoubtedly turn people against U.S. interests in the Middle East, and will lead to soldier’s deaths that need not happen.

On the military side of the house, counter insurgency forces are seeking to remove insurgents from the general population by using the best means possible – in some cases through combat, in other cases, through patrols and creating an otherwise inhospitable environment for them, cutting off support or removing key people from influence. This job will ultimately be harder when more of the general population (who is already at or beyond the tipping point) has another reason to distrust U.S. troops. The interests of the United States overseas are not to push any sort of religious agenda: it is to secure U.S. interest overseas by eliminating the possibility of insurgent terrorism from happening again.

On the public relations side, this paints the country in an exceedingly poor light, because insurgency forces can point to instances such as this and use it as a sort of proof that the U.S. is intolerant and seeks to rid the world of people. That’s not the case, but hard facts don’t matter in these instances: the thought and idea does, just as any conspiracy theorist believes wholeheartedly in whatever they believe in, no matter what proof is presented. The country has its share of issues, but comparatively, the country hasn’t resorted to bombings or widespread attacks on its citizens at the bequest of the government that rules it.

In any case, what this church is doing is downright sad, and goes against everything that I know the bible to teach (granted, that is a bit limited) , and it is those lessons that look far more to peace and order that I would rather teach and leave an impression with.

Conventional Counterinsurgency

It is interesting at how much an education can change your viewpoints on something. When I was in late high school, I picked up a book called Black Hawk Down, by Mark Bowden, which recounted the Battle of Mogadishu, waged by U.S. Special Forces and local militia forces as the U.S. military attempted to capture warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. In the seventeen years since that initial battle, the firefight that occurred during that day which essentially provides a preview of what is to come.

Interestingly, the film adaptation of the book (and real life events) was released in December of 2001, just a couple of months after the attacks on the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and the World Trade Center buildings in New York City. Shortly after said attacks, U.S. Special Forces entered Afghanistan, and began was has been known as the Global War on Terror. Hindsight is a dangerous thing to use, especially when connecting major events, but looking back to the 1993 firefight in Somalia, it's clear that the U.S. simply wasn't geared towards fighting the type of warfare that presented itself in the Middle East and nearby hotspots. Throughout much of the recent history, the military had been positioned towards combating a major enemy, the Soviet Union, and subsequent international actions, such as the Gulf War of 1991, just a couple of years prior to the Somalia fight, seemed to affirm that warfare would remain as a style of centralized, organized warfare, against a static enemy who followed all of the rules. Somalia, a small action, seemed to be an abnormality, something that would be unlikely to happen again.

In his book, The Sling and the Stone, retired Colonel Thomas Hammes, of the United States Marine Corps, notes that this change in warfare was nothing new. The conventional nature of what is generally termed 3rd Generation Warfare, is a style of fighting that the United States had worked and became very good at, but historical evidence points to the emergence of a 4th Generation of warfare, which Hammes describes as a style of warfare that "uses all available networks - political, economic, social, and military- to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit." (Hammes, The Sling and the Stone. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006, 2). While he goes on to note that this style of warfare is an evolved method of insurgency, I believe that it is in fact the other way around - insurgency is a natural progression of warfare in this instance, and in a large way, 4th Generation warfare falls well within the general constraints of warfare as described by Carl Von Clausewitz in his book, On War:  "War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale....War is therefore an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." (Clausewitz, On War, New York: Penguin Putnam, 1968, 101). Insurgencies, in this instance, seem to be made up of a new understanding of networks, combined with technology in unexpected methods to achieve a formidable resistance to an organized force.

The events that occurred in Black Hawk Down prove to be a good example of this style of warfare in action, but also the root causes that provide a valuable context for the conflicts that are ongoing. In the film adaptation of the book, a boy is seen to have alerted militia forces by holding up a cellular telephone to the sky as the Task Force Ranger helicopters flew overhead. Whether this happened or not, I'm not sure (paging through the book, I wasn't able to find mention of it), but the scene made me recall the November 2008 coordinated attacks in Mumbai, India, when several teams of insurgents, armed with guns and explosives, used mobile phones to help kill 173 and wound 308. The use of technology has become integrated with insurgency warfare, allowing for a low-key method for coordinating attacks and personnel without having the benefit of a major organized military. The fighting against Islamic fundamentalist forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan are generally not at the hands of an organized military force acting on the behalf of a recognized government, but are representative of smaller political factions and warlords within established boundaries.

Despite this early evidence that there were changes in the ways that wars had been fought (Hammes cites Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia as examples of where this style of warfare had been seen), this ran counter to the then-nature of how the military conducted itself. "The essence of the American army, in the eyes of its career officers, is ground combat by organized, regular divisional nuts. Although the American army tolerates the existence of subcultures that do not directly contribute to the essence of the organization, these peripheral organizations do not receive the support accorder to the army core constituencies of armor, infantry, and artillery." (Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, 6) The current War on Terror and ongoing conflicts is a demonstration of this, as the U.S. entered into major hostilities with Iraq and Afghanistan with one style and mindset of conducting the war, and discovering that entirely new methods were necessary when it came to countering insurgency forces.

Looking over the events of Black Hawk Down, there are elements of current counter-insurgency doctrine, or at least several best practices that highlight the differences between counterinsurgency warfare and organized maneuver warfare. Hammes notes that prior to the United Nations taking over the peacekeeping operations, U.S. Marines aggressively patrolled the streets of Mogadishu, talking with the local inhabitants, and recognizing when someone from outside that neighborhood entered. As the war in Iraq and Afghanistan have progressed, this has become a focus of the new Counterinsurgency doctrine, with soldiers encouraged to work closely with local inhabitants of neighborhoods and streets in an effort to remove insurgency forces from the local population, depriving them of population support. While watching and reading Black Hawk Down, I see a battle that was the result of a failure in vision and peacekeeping leadership. As Hammes notes, the decision to draw back into major bases, while leaving the population in the hands of militia forces was a drastic one that spelled out dire consequences for U.S. forces. At the same time, the leaders tasked with peacekeeping were unable to prevent insurgent and militia forces from operating and controlling the areas that they needed to protect. Similar actions would later occur in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the United States pulled out of the cities of Iraq in favor of major bases, only to find that violence levels dropped with the implementation of smaller bases amongst the populations. The so-called surge in Iraq was not simply more soldiers deployed to the country, but it was the change in tactics, with the manpower to carry out these changes.

In an article for Foreign Policy magazine, "The New Rules of War" March/April 2010), John Arquilla notes that the differences between conventional and unconventional warfare require entirely new methods of approaching warfare. Insurgency warfare (commonly referred to as 4G), allows for a far more decentralized style of fighting: Where prior approaches to countering insurgent forces had been to apply more force, "Nothing could be further from the truth, as the results in Iraq and Afghanistan so painfully demonstrate...the evidence of the last 10 years shows clearly that massive application of force have done little more than kill the innocent and enrage their survivors. Networked organizations like al Qaeda have proven how easy it is to dodge such heavy punches and persist to land sharp counterblows." (Arquilla, "The New Rules of War", Foreign Policy Magazine, March/April 2010)

The end result is that fighting a war the wrong way causes more problems, and ultimately fulfills the mantra of decentralized, networked insurgency groups: cause an invading power more problems than is worth it in order to convince their parent governments, and by extension, the population that supports it, that the efforts overseas are simply not worth it. The U.S. experience in Vietnam demonstrated that a massive conventional force had a lot of trouble fighting in ways that it was not prepared for. As a result, the U.S. military eliminated counterinsurgency planning and training in the aftermath, vowing to never again fight in a style of war that it was not prepared to fight. While a noble goal, it seems to have been a short sighted decision, even in light of continued successes of conventional military victories since then, such as with the British military against the Argentineans in the 1980s, and with United States forces against Iraqi forces in 1991's Gulf War. However, militaries do not get to pick how their opponents fight, and must be aware to all types of influences on warfare in areas that they are fighting: the methods of terrorist and militia style forces had existed for years, and examples such as Somalia demonstrated that these styles of fighting existed, and that adequate planning for such fighting had not been implemented. The result in Somalia was the death of 18 soldiers.

The results coming from Iraq and Afghanistan are much more dire, and I can't help but wonder what changes might have been made had the full context and lessons from Somalia had truly been learned by policy-makers and military thinkers at the time. As hindsight is much cleared now, it's easy to make such declarations, and even at this point, the future of warfare is still something that is very unclear. As such, the real lesson that the United States should learn is from the aftermath of Vietnam with the destruction of the planning and training for counterinsurgency fighting: planning and realization of conflicts is a key element in the military, as well as the ability to adapt far more quickly to actions and differences in fighting styles based on the long history that the United States has had with combat.

The Dawn of the Nuclear Age

Today marks the 65th anniversary of the detonation of 'Little Boy', the first nuclear warhead in the U.S. arsenal to be used as an act of war, and changing the world upon its use. The bomb, which was followed by 'Fat Man' on August 9th, caused casualties in the hundreds of thousands, with its effects lasting far into the present day. The United States marked a change in policy earlier today when Ambassador John Roos attended the reemergence ceremony earlier today. The onset of nuclear warfare marked a massive change in the structure and hierarchy of the world.

The culmination of the Manhattan Project and the subsequent implementation of nuclear arms into the U.S. arsenal was the result of years of work and research on the part of the United States, and one that remains fiercely debated to this day. The first, and only use of the weapons over Japan sparked much attention, but in and of itself was a single element in a larger strategy that was used to extend U.S. military power abroad. Earlier bombing runs, notably with the switch from conventional explosives to incendiary explosives on the part of the Army Air Force over Japan yielded similar results to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings: a high number of civilian casualties and military targets were directly attacked, killing hundreds of thousands. The nuclear warheads are in and of themselves notable because of the sheer destructive force, and the ease to which an opposing force can destroy a comparable target when examined alongside prior methods. Previously, it required a large bombing force over enemy territory, where planes were susceptible to anti-air craft fire and mechanical breakdown. With a single air craft, the ability to do the same appeared.

It would seem that with the smaller force, and ease of destruction, that nuclear warfare would be an inevitable end to civilization as we know it. Large military forces require far more expenditure, logistics and manpower to accomplish their goals, with steep casualty costs, as seen in the casualty rates of the airmen who ventured over Axis-occupied territory during the Second World War. This misses the point, I believe, of the ease of destruction often predicted by science fiction authors. The scary thing itself isn't the bomb itself, but the system in which deploys it. The Second World War industrialized warfare to an incredible degree due to military necessity, and as a single nation almost untouched by war on its own borders, the United States found itself with the manpower, equipment and weapons in which to enforce its will across the world. When the Soviet Union joined the nuclear club, it acted as a balance of power, but one that tread upon very uneasy ground, as the potential for nuclear warfare grew immensely, and teetered on the edge at such moments like the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Fortunately, the fears of apocalypse never came to pass: cooler heads prevailed, and the implimentation of strategy that was designed to deter, rather than to destroy outright came to pass, but the introduction of nuclear weapons demonstrated that the balance of power had changed in a profound way: nations could enforce their will through the threat of force, and advances in science and technology allowed for a continued strategy on the part of the countries that were involved in the Cold War. In a real sense, with such advances, the world became a truly global, interconnected place, and affairs that had once been inconsequential now became important to the world as a whole.

The Nuclear age arguably never began with the Japan bombings, but earlier, as military strategy attempted to find ways in which to end the threat to U.S. interests. In doing so, unprecedented measures were undertaken: cities were destroyed, in what can be looked at as the closest thing to apocalypse and speculative fiction one has ever seen, and examining the aftermath provides for some almost surreal accounts: it is no wonder that people believed that the world would end with a flash of light, and it is uncomforting to realize that this sort of threat is one that is ongoing: the Cold War has since ended, but the threat of nuclear power is still one that will exist while such weapons exist, and will undoubtedly continue to influence those who look towards the future. What needs to be determined from policy makers and strategists as to the true risk, and to determine if the stakes are high enough.

The Original Mad Scientist: Nikolas Tesla

When looking at the roots of the modern world, one needs to not look further than one man, Nikolas Tesla, for a notable example. A bright mind from an early age, Tesla defines the term 'genius', and from an early age, demonstrated an ability for innovation and invention, and would later go on to enlighten the world: literally.

Born in January of 1856 in Croatia (then the Austrian Empire), Tesla's intelligence and intellect exhibited itself at an early age. In his autobiography, My Inventions, he noted that "suffered from a peculiar affliction due to the appearance of images, often accompanied by strong flashes of light, which marred the sight of real objects and interfered with my thought and action. They were pictures of things and scenes which I had really scene, never of those I imagined." He attributes this ability to strongly conceptualize and visualize as a key element in how he was able to invent various things, and early on, was frightened by this perceived ability. From an early age, he began to invent various objects: a hook to catch frogs, air powered guns, as well as dismantled clocks and at one point, fixed a fire engine's hose during a demonstration to the town.

Following this, at the age of six, he attended the Higher Real Gymnasium Karlovac, finishing out his time there in three years, instead of the four generally required. After he had finished, Tesla was stricken with Cholera. This incident encouraged his parents to send him to school for science and engineering, where they had previously hoped that he would join the clergy. Recovering, Tesla was permitted to join the Austrian Polytechnic in Graz in 1875,  where he further excelled and became further interested in physics and engineering, becoming interested in creating motors, a particularly early step in his work in alternate current.

In 1880, he relocated to Prague, Bohemia, at the Charles-Ferdinand University, before realizing that his academic pursuits were putting a strain on his parents. Leaving the school, he sought work at the National Telephone Company, before moving in 1882 to Paris, where he worked for the Continental Edison Company, working on electrical equipment, and two years later, he travelled to the United States, seeking to work for Thomas Edison. In a letter of recommendation from Charles Batchelor, a former employer and friend of Tesla's, it noted that "I know two great men and you are one of them; the other is this young man". This was a rather positive start to a relationship that would quickly sour. Tesla went to work for Edison, who had promised him $50,000 for his work to upgrade and repair generators, but shortly after the work was done, Edison claimed that he had been making a joke, and Tesla, furious, left the company.

Telsa then formed his own company, Tesla Electric Light & Manufacturing, where be began to work on his method of Alternate Current, which he believed was far cheaper and safer than the Direct Current that was used across the world by this point, but due to issues with the company, he was soon removed. In 1888, he began work under George Westinghouse at the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, where he worked on his alternating current and studied what were later understood to be x-rays. Over the next several years, Tesla continued his work in electronics and physics.

During this time, both he and Edison became adversaries, with Edison invested in his Direct Current technology, while Tesla and Westinghouse backed Alternate Current. Edison implemented a public campaign against AC power, touting accidents and the fact that AC power was used for the first electric chair. The tide turned, however, when Westinghouse's company was awarded a contract to harness the power of Niagara falls to generate electrical power, which resulted in a positive, highly public and practical test of AC power, while the 1893 Chicago World Fair likewise utilized Tesla's power system in a highly public fashion. The result was a shift from the utilization of DC power to AC power, which allowed for a greater range for power, and over the next century, DC power was phased out.

In 1899, Tesla moved to Colorado Springs (where he was portrayed by David Bowie in Christopher Nolan's film, The Prestige), where he continued his experiments with electricity. He created several methods for transmitting power wirelessly, and in 1900, he began work on the Wardenclyffe Tower with funds from J.P. Morgan, a wireless transmission tower. The tower was completed, but the project ran short of funds, and was eventually discontinued. Tesla lost several patents at the same time, and in the years that followed, he continued scientific research, designing things such as a directed energy weapon, but found little support for his plans. In the last decades of his life, he began suffering from a mental illness, and passed away in 1943 at his home in New York City.

Tesla is a figure that has captured the imagination of the geek community, but is at the same time someone who is almost single-handedly responsible for the transmission of power that covers the nation, a necessity in modern life. In fiction, he has been portrayed several times (the aforementioned appearance in The Prestige is a good example), but is known for his intellect and forward thinking in science and technology. Several of his inventions, such as a death ray and wireless power, are still elements that belong to the science fictional realm.

What is most astonishing, reading over Tesla's 36 page autobiography, is his ability to conceive of projects and carry them out, understanding them almost completely. He appears to have had a very rare gift, one that borders on the supernatural, or to some, some sort of mental illness or disability that allowed him unprecedented abilities. In the truest sense how I see geekdom, Tesla fits all of the marks, a textbook case of following a passion extensively, and changing the world as he did so.

Defining Geek History

Before looking at exactly what 'geek history' is, the term must be defined, to give the term relevance, but also the content that should be looked at. With those elements in mind, an examination of the history behind the Geekdom becomes much easier, but also allows for someone to look at the greater significance for how exactly Geek History is in any way important.

A couple of years ago, Ben Nugent published a book titled American Nerd: The Story Of My People, a short book that was part biography, part history and part examination of culture. While I wasn't particularly impressed with the book as a whole, there were a number of very good ideas there, particularly in how he defined a geek or a nerd-type person. It boiled down to a fairly simple concept: a geek/nerd (minus the social connotations) is someone who is extremely passionate about any given subject, learning all that they can about it. They tend to be readers, and because of this attention, there's a tendency to miss out on some social elements that most people take for granted. The subject itself doesn't necessarily matter, and I've generally assumed that geeks/nerds tend to gravitate towards the science fiction / fantasy realms because the content is more appealing.

By this definition, education, literacy and an attention to detail are paramount, defining elements in how geeks and nerds are defined. In a country where education seems to be a point against an individual, it's even more important to understand the role that such things play with the public, and to recognize the importance of individuals in the past, and how their actions and knowledge has helped to define the present that we now know today.

In a large way, looking at geekdom in history is akin to looking at major historical figures who have the largest impact because of their contributions to events through conception, rather than just actions. These are people who help to develop ideas in a number of different stages, either formulating designs, concepts of plans, or helping to see some major thing through. With the Geek definition in mind, people such as this also tend to be very hands on with a lot of their work, being directly involved with their projects, or singlehandedly putting something together that changes how people think about the world afterwards. In some cases, this is a simple person to pick out: an author of a notable book, or a director of a film. Other instances, where science and industry are involved, this would be slightly more difficult, given the collaborative nature of some of these projects.

Looking at Geek History, then, is looking at the people who change the future because of their ideas, rather than predominantly implementing these changes themselves. These creators were instrumental in putting items in place that likewise changed how people interact with the world, and in addition to examining the people behind the advances, it's also important to look at how their works, whether they're inventions, novels, films or even events, helped to transform the world into a much different place.

Geek History largely comes down to the history of knowledge and ideas. Given the general rise in popularity in geek things, I tend to think of this style of history as one that looks to the past hundred to hundred and fifty years, simply because of the general proximity of the modern day, and more highly relevant to the modern sort of geek movement. However, there's elements of this line of thinking that extend far more into the past, mixing science and social histories that can likely go back to the beginning of the examination of thought itself.

The study and appreciation of the modern geek movement should look at the roots and elements that make up the modern geek, from the tools that are used to the entertainment that we soak up to the way that we think and approach the world. It's far more than the stereotypes, it's in everything that makes up those stereotypes.